On Kilian's Randomization of Multilinear Map Encodings by Coron, Jean-Sébastien & Pereira, Vitor
On Kilian’s Randomization of Multilinear Map Encodings
Jean-Se´bastien Coron and Hilder V. L. Pereira
University of Luxembourg
Abstract. Indistinguishability obfuscation constructions based on matrix branching programs gener-
ally proceed in two steps: first apply Kilian’s randomization of the matrix product computation, and
then encode the matrices using a multilinear map scheme. In this paper we observe that by applying
Kilian’s randomization after encoding, the complexity of the best attacks is significantly increased for
CLT13 multilinear maps. This implies that much smaller parameters can be used, which improves the
efficiency of the constructions by several orders of magnitude.
As an application, we describe the first concrete implementation of multiparty non-interactive Diffie-
Hellman key exchange secure against existing attacks. Key exchange was originally the most straight-
forward application of multilinear maps; however it was quickly broken for the three known families
of multilinear maps (GGH13, CLT13 and GGH15). Here we describe the first implementation of key
exchange that is resistant against known attacks, based on CLT13 multilinear maps. For N = 4 users
and a medium level of security, our implementation requires 18 GB of public parameters, and a few
minutes for the derivation of a shared key.
1 Introduction
Multilinear maps and indistinguishability obfuscation. Since the breakthrough construc-
tion of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a], cryptographic multilinear maps have shown amazingly
powerful applications in cryptography, most notably the first plausible construction of program ob-
fuscation [GGH+13b]. A multilinear map scheme encodes plaintext values {ai} into encodings {[ai]}
such that the ai’s are hidden; only a restricted class of polynomials can then be evaluated over these
encoded values; eventually one can determine whether the evaluation is zero or not, using the zero
testing procedure of the multilinear map scheme.
The goal of program obfuscation is to hide secrets in arbitrary running programs. The first plau-
sible construction of general program obfuscation was described by Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova,
Sahai and Waters (GGHRSW) in [GGH+13b], based on multilinear maps; the construction has
opened many new research directions, because the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) has
tremendous applications in cryptography [SW14]. Since the publication of the GGHRSW construc-
tion, many variants of GGHRSW have been described [MSW14,AGIS14,PST14,BGK+14,BMSZ16].
Currently there are essentially only three known candidate constructions of multilinear maps:
• GGH13. The first candidate construction of multilinear maps is based on ideal lattices [GGH13a].
Its security relies on the difficulty of the NTRU problem and the principal ideal problem (PIP)
in certain number fields.
• CLT13. An analogous construction but over the integers was described in [CLT13], based on
the DGHV fully homomorphic encryption scheme [DGHV10].
• GGH15. Gentry, Gorbunov and Halevi described another multilinear maps scheme [GGH15],
based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem with encoding over matrices, and defined
with respect to a directed acyclic graph.
However the security of multilinear maps is still poorly understood. The most important attacks
against multilinear maps are “zeroizing attacks”, which consist in using linear algebra to recover
the secrets of the scheme from the encodings of zero. At Eurocrypt 2015, Cheon et al. described
a devastating zeroizing attack against CLT13; when CLT13 is used to implement non-interactive
multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the attack completely breaks the protocol [CHL+15]. The
attack was also extended to encodings variants, where encodings of zero are not directly available
[CGH+15]. The key-exchange protocol based on GGH13 was also broken by a zeroizing attack in
[HJ16]. Finally, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol under GGH15 was broken in [CLLT16],
using an extension of the Cheon et al. zeroizing attack.
However, not all attacks against the above multilinear map schemes can be applied to indis-
tinguishability obfuscation. While multipartite key exchange based on any of the three families of
multilinear map schemes is broken, iO is not necessarily broken by zeroizing attacks, because of
the particular structure that iO constructions induce on the computation of multilinear map en-
coded values. Namely, in iO constructions, no low-level encodings of zeroes are available, and the
obfuscation of a matrix branching program can only produce zeroes at the last level, moreover
when evaluated in a very specific way. However some partial attacks against iO constructions have
already been described. In [CGH+15] it was shown how to break the GGHRSW branching-program
obfuscator when instantiated using CLT13, when the branching program to be obfuscated has a
very simple structure (input partition). For GGH13, Miles, Sahai and Zhandry introduced “annihi-
lation attacks” [MSZ16] that can break many obfuscation schemes based on GGH13; however, the
attack does not apply to the GGHRSW construction, because in GGHRSW the matrix program
is embedded in a larger matrix with random entries (diagonal padding). In [CGH17], the authors
showed how to break iO constructions under GGH13, using a variant of the input partitioning at-
tack; the attack applies against the GGHRSW construction with diagonal padding. A new tensoring
technique was introduced in [CLLT17] to break iO constructions for branching programs without
the input partition structure. Finally, an attack against iO over GGH15 was described in [CVW18]
based on computing the rank of a certain matrix.
Obfuscating matrix branching programs. The GGHRSW construction and its variants consist
of a “core component” for obfuscating matrix branching programs, and a bootstrapping procedure
to obfuscate arbitrary programs based on the core component, using fully homomorphic encryption
and proofs of correct computation. The core component relies on multilinear maps for evaluat-
ing a product of encoded matrices corresponding to a branching program, without revealing the
underlying value of those matrices.
More precisely, the core component of the GGHRSW construction and its variants proceeds in
two steps: first apply Kilian’s randomization of the matrix product computation, and then encode
the matrices using a multilinear map scheme. In this paper, our main observation is that for CLT13
multilinear maps, the complexity of the best attacks is significantly increased when Kilian’s ran-
domization is also applied after encoding. We note that applying Kilian’s randomization “on the
encoding side” was already used in GGH15 multilinear maps as an additional safeguard [GGH15,
§5.1]. For CLT13 this implies that one can use much smaller parameters (noise and encoding size),
which improves the efficiency of the constructions by several orders of magnitude.
More precisely, a matrix branching program BP of length n is evaluated on input x ∈ {0, 1}` by
computing:
C(x) = b0 ×
n∏
i=1
Bi,xinp(i) × bn+1 (1)
where {Bi,b}1≤i≤n,b∈{0,1} are square matrices and b0 and bn+1 are bookend vectors; then BP(x) = 0
if C(x) = 0, and BP(x) = 1 otherwise. The function inp(i) indicates which bit of x is read at step
i of the product matrix computation. To obfuscate a matrix branching program, the GGHRSW
construction proceeds in two steps. First one randomizes the matrices Bi,b as in Kilian’s protocol
[Kil88]: choose n + 1 random invertible matrices {Ri}ni=0 and set B˜i,b = Ri−1Bi,bR−1i , with also
b˜0 = b0R
−1
0 and b˜n+1 = Rnbn+1. The randomized matrix branching program can then be evaluated
by computing
C(x) = b˜0 ×
n∏
i=1
B˜i,xinp(i) × b˜n+1.
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Namely the successive randomization matrices Ri cancel each other; therefore the matrix product
computation evaluates to the same result as in (1).
The second step in the GGHRSW construction is to encode the entries of the matrices B˜i,b
using a multilinear map scheme. Every entry of a given matrix is encoded separately; the bookend
vectors b˜0 and b˜n are also encoded similarly. Therefore one defines the matrices and vectors
Bˆi,b = Encode{i+1}(B˜i,b), bˆ0 = Encode{1}(b˜0), bˆn = Encode{n+2}(b˜n+2).
The matrix branching program from (1) can then be evaluated over the encoded matrices:
Cˆ(x) = bˆ0 ×
n∏
i=1
Bˆi,xinp(i) × bˆn+1 (2)
Eventually one obtains an encoded Cˆ(x) over the universe set S = {1, . . . , n+ 2}, and one can use
the zero-testing procedure of the multilinear map scheme to check if C(x) = 0, thereby learning
the output of the branching program BP(x), without revealing the values of the matrices Bi,b. It
was shown in [BGK+14] that if the multilinear map scheme is ideal, i.e. if the multilinear map
only reveals whether or not the evaluation is zero and does not leak anything else, then the above
obfuscation scheme is secure.
(In)efficiency of iO. However, even with some efficiency improvements (as in [AGIS14]), the
main issue is that indistinguishability obfuscation is currently not feasible to implement in practice.
The first obstacle is that when converting the input circuit to a matrix branching program using
Barrington’s theorem [Bar86], one induces an enormous cost in performance, as the length of the
branching program grows exponentially with the depth of the circuit being evaluated. The second
obstacle is that the multilinear map noise and parameters grow with the degree of the polynomial
being computed over encoded elements, which corresponds to the length of the matrix branching
program.
In this paper, we consider both issues. For the second one, we show that for CLT13 multilinear
maps, when applying Kilian’s randomization “on the encoding side”, one can significantly reduce the
noise and encoding size while keeping the same level of security; this leads to major improvements
of performance. For the first issue, we craft a sequence of matrix products that only performs
a multipartite DH key-exchange, rather than generating one from a circuit through Barrington’s
theorem, so that its degree becomes much more manageable. We can then describe the first concrete
implementation of multipartite DH key-exchange based on multilinear maps that is resistant against
existing attacks.
Kilian’s randomization on the encoding side. As already observed in [GGH15], Kilian’s
randomization can also be applied over the encoding space, as an additional safeguard. Namely
starting from the encoded matrices Bˆi,b used to compute Cˆ(x) as in Equation (2), one can again
choose n+ 1 random invertible matrices {Rˆi}ni=0 and then randomize the matrices Bˆi,b with:
B¯i,b = Rˆi−1Bˆi,bRˆ−1i
with also b¯0 = bˆ0Rˆ
−1
0 and b¯n+1 = Rˆnbˆn+1. Since the matrices Rˆi cancel each other in the matrix
product computation, the evaluation proceeds exactly as in (2), with
Cˆ(x) = b¯0 ×
n∏
i=1
B¯i,xinp(i) × b¯n+1,
and therefore the same zero-testing procedure can be applied to Cˆ(x). Note that the Rˆi matrices
are applied on the encoding side, that is on the encoded matrices Bˆi,b, instead of the plaintext
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matrices Bi,b as previously; obviously both randomizations (before and after encoding) can be
applied independently.
In this paper we focus on Kilian’s randomization on the encoding side in the context of the
CLT13 multilinear maps. In CLT13 the encoding space is the set of integers modulo x0, where
x0 =
∏n
j=1 pj ; therefore the matrices {Rˆi}ni=0 are random invertible matrices modulo x0. We show
that the complexity of the best attacks against CLT13 is significantly increased thanks to Kilian’s
randomization of the encodings. One can therefore use much smaller parameters (noise size and
encoding size), which can improve the efficiency of a construction by several orders of magnitude.
More precisely, the security of CLT13 is based on the hardness of the multi-prime Approximate-
GCD problem. Given x0 =
∏n
i=1 pi for random primes pi, and polynomially many integers cj such
that
cj ≡ rij (mod pi) (3)
for small integers rij ’s, the goal is to recover the secret primes pi’s. The multi-prime Approximate-
GCD problem is an extension of the single-prime problem, with a single prime p to be recovered
from encodings cj = qj · p + rj and x0 = q0 · p, for small integers rj . The two main approaches for
solving the Approximate-GCD problem are the orthogonal lattice attacks and the GCD attacks.
First contribution: solving the multi-prime Approximate-GCD problem. For the single-
prime Approximate-GCD problem, the classical orthogonal lattice attack has complexity 2Ω(γ/η
2),
where γ is the size of x0 and η is the size of the prime p; see [DGHV10, §5.2]. However, extending
the attack to the multi-prime case as in CLT13 is actually not straightforward; in particular, we
argue that the approach described in [CLT13] is incomplete and does not recover the primes pi’s,
except for small values of n; we note that solving the multi-prime case was actually considered as
an open problem in [GGM16].
Our first contribution is to solve this open problem with an algorithm that proceeds in two steps.
The first step is the classical orthogonal lattice attack; it recovers a basis of the lattice generated
by the vectors ri = c mod pi, where c = (c1, . . . , ct). However, the vectors ri cannot be recovered
directly; namely by applying LLL or BKZ one recovers a basis of moderately short vectors, and not
necessarily the ri’s which are the shortest vectors in the lattice. Therefore the approach described
in [CLT13] does not work, except in low dimension. In the second step of our algorithm, using the
lattice basis obtained from the first step, we show that by computing the eigenvalues of a well chosen
matrix, we can recover the primes pi’s, as in the Cheon et al. attack [CHL
+15]. The asymptotic
complexity of the full attack is the same as in the single-prime case; using γ = η · n for the size
of x0 as previously, where n is the number of primes pi, the complexity is 2
Ω(n/η). Therefore, as
in [CLT13], one must take n = ω(η log λ) to prevent the lattice attack, where λ is the security
parameter.
Second contribution: extension to the Vector Approximate-GCD problem. When work-
ing with matrix branching programs and Kilian’s randomization on the encoding side, we must
actually consider a vector variant of the Approximate-GCD problem, in which we have access to
randomized vectors of encodings instead of scalar values as in (3). Therefore, our second contribu-
tion is to extend the orthogonal lattice attack to the Vector Approximate-GCD problem, and to
show that the extended attack has complexity 2Ω(m·n/η), for vectors of dimension m. This implies
that the new condition on the number n of primes pi in CLT13 becomes:
n = ω
( η
m
log λ
)
Compared to the previous condition, the number of primes n in CLT13 can therefore be divided
by a factor m, for the same level of security, where m is the matrix dimension. This implies that
the encoding size γ can also be divided by a factor m, which provides a significant improvement in
efficiency.
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Third contribution: GCD attacks against the Vector Approximate-GCD problem. The
naive GCD attack against the Approximate-GCD problem with c1 = q1 ·p+r1 and x0 = q0 ·p consists
in computing gcd(c1 − r1, x0) for all possible r1 and has complexity O(2ρ), where ρ is the bitsize of
r1. At Eurocrypt 2012, Chen and Nguyen [CN12] described an improved attack based on multipoint
polynomial evaluation, with complexity O˜(2ρ/2). The Chen-Nguyen attack was later extended by
Lee and Seo at Crypto 2014 [LS14], when the ci’s are multiplicatively masked by a random secret
z modulo x0, as it is the case in the CLT13 scheme; their attack has the same complexity O˜(2ρ/2).
As previously, when working with matrix branching programs and Kilian’s randomization on
the encoding side, we must consider the vector variant of the Approximate-GCD problem. Our
third contribution is therefore to extend the Lee-Seo attack to this vector variant; we obtain a
complexity O˜(2m·ρ/2) instead of O˜(2ρ/2), where m is the vector dimension. Assuming that this is
the best possible attack, one can therefore divide the noise size ρ by a factor m. Similarly, when
Kilian’s randomization is applied to a m×m matrix, we show that the attack complexity becomes
O˜(2m2·ρ/2), and therefore the noise size ρ used to encode those matrices in CLT13 can be divided
by m2. Combined with the previous improvement, this improves the efficiency of CLT13 based
constructions by several orders of magnitude.
Fourth contribution: non-interactive DH key exchange from multilinear maps. In prin-
ciple the most straightforward application of multilinear maps is non-interactive multipartite Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key exchange with N users, a natural generalization of the DH protocol for 3 users
based on the bilinear pairing. This was originally described for GGH13, CLT13 and GGH15, but
was quickly broken for the three families of multilinear maps; in particular, key exchange based on
CLT13 was broken by the Cheon et al. attack [CHL+15]. The main question is therefore:
Can we construct a practical N -way non-interactive key-exchange protocol from candidate
multilinear maps constructions?
In this paper we provide a first step in that direction. Namely our fourth contribution is to
describe the first implementation of N -way DH key exchange resistant against known attacks. Our
construction is based on CLT13 multilinear maps and is secure against the Cheon et al. attack
and its variants. Our construction contains many ingredients from the GGHRSW and other similar
constructions. Namely we express the session key as the result of a matrix product computation,
and we embed the matrices into larger randomized matrices before encoding, together with some
special “bookend” components at the start and end of the computation, as in [GGH+13b]. We use
the “multiplicative bundling” technique from [GGH+13b] to prevent the adversary from combining
the matrices in arbitrary ways. As explained previously, we use Kilian’s randomization on the
encoding side. With no additional cost, we can also use the straddling set systems from [BGK+14]
to further constrain the attacker, and Kilian’s randomization at the plaintext level. Finally, we use
k repetitions in order to prevent the Cheon et al. attack against CLT13, when considering input
partitioning attacks as in [CGH+15], and its extension with the tensoring attack [CLLT17]. We
argue that the extended Cheon et al. attack has complexity Ω(m2k−1) in our scheme, where m is
the matrix dimension and k the number of repetitions.
For N = 4 users and a medium (62 bits) level of security, our implementation requires 18 GB
of public parameters, and a few minutes for the derivation of a shared key. We note that without
Kilian’s randomization of encodings our construction would be completely unpractical, as it would
require more than 100 TB of public parameters.
Related work. In [MZ18], Ma and Zhandry described a multilinear map scheme built on top of
CLT13 that is provably resistant against zeroizing attack, and which can be used to directly construct
a non-interactive DH key-exchange. More precisely, the authors develop a new weak multilinear map
model for CLT13 to capture all known attack strategies against CLT13. The authors then construct
5
a new multilinear map scheme on top of CLT13 that is secure in this model. The construction is
based on multiplying matrices of CLT13 encodings as in iO schemes. To prevent zeroizing attacks,
the same input is read multiple times, as in iO constructions. The input consistency is ensured
by a clever use of “enforcing” matrices based on some permutation invariant property. Finally,
the authors construct a non-interactive DH key-exchange scheme based on their new multilinear
map scheme. However, the authors do not provide implementation results nor concrete parameters
(except for multilinear map degree and number of public encodings), so it is difficult to assess the
practicality of their construction. The authors still provide the following parameters for a 4-party
DH key exchange with 80 bits of security; see Table 1. We provide our corresponding parameters
for comparison (see more details in Section 7).
Scheme MMap degree Public encodings Public-key size
Boneh et al. [BISW17] 4150 244
Ma-Zhandry (setting 1) 52 262
Ma-Zhandry (setting 2) 160 233
Ma-Zhandry (setting 3) 1040 219
Ma-Zhandry (setting 4) 2000 214
Our construction 266 220 1848 GB
Table 1. Comparison of parameters for 4-party DH key exchange, with 80 bits of security.
The main advantage of the Ma-Zhandry construction is that it has a proof of security in a
weak multilinear map model, whereas our construction has heuristic security only. It seems from
Table 1 that our construction would require a smaller multilinear map degree for the same number
of public encodings. We stress however that providing concrete parameters is actually a complex
optimization problem (see Section 7), so Table 1 should be handled with care. In any case, the
Ma-Zhandry construction can certainly benefit from our analysis, since Kilian’s randomization on
the encoding side can also be applied “for free” in their construction.
Source code. We provide the source code of our construction, and the source code of the attacks,
in [CP19].
2 Preliminaries
We denote by [a]n or a mod n the unique integer x ∈ (−n2 , n2 ] which is congruent to a modulo n.
The set {1, 2, . . . , n} is denoted by [n].
2.1 The CLT13 multilinear map
We briefly recall the (asymmetric) CLT13 multilinear map scheme; we refer to [CLT13] for a full
description. For large secret primes pi’s, let x0 =
∏n
k=1 pi, where n is the number of primes. We
denote by η the bitsize of the pi’s, and by γ the bitsize of x0; therefore γ ' n · η. The plaintext
space of CLT13 is Zg1 × Zg2 × · · · × Zgn for secret prime integers gi’s of α bits.
The CLT13 scheme is based on CRT representations. We denote by CRT(a1, . . . , an) or CRT(ai)i
the number a ∈ Zx0 such that a ≡ ai (mod pi) for all i ∈ [n]. An encoding of a vector m =
(m1, . . . ,mn) at level set S = {j} is an integer c ∈ Zx0 such that c = [CRT(m1 + g1r1, . . . ,mn +
gnrn)/zj ]x0 for integers ri of size ρ bits, where zj is a secret mask in Zx0 uniformly chosen during
the parameters generation procedure of the multilinear map. This gives:
c ≡ mi + giri
zj
(mod pi) (4)
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for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. To support a `-level multilinearity, one uses ` distinct zj ’s.
It is clear that encodings from the same level can be added via addition modulo x0. Similarly
multiplication between encodings can be done by modular multiplication in Zx0 , but the encodings
must be of disjoint level sets; the resulting encoding level set is then the union of the input level
sets. At the top level set S = {1, . . . , `}, one can zero-test an encoding by multiplication with the
zero-test parameter
pzt =
∏`
j=1
zj
 · CRT(p∗ihig−1i )i mod x0,
where p∗i = x0/pi and the hi’s are random β-bit integers. Namely given a top-level encoding c with
c =
CRT (mi + giri)i∏`
j=1 zj
mod x0,
we obtain after multiplication by pzt:
c · pzt = CRT(hip∗i (mig−1i + ri))i =
n∑
i=1
hip
∗
i (mig
−1
i + ri) (mod x0) (5)
and therefore if mi = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n then the result will be small compared to x0. From the
previous equation the high-order bits of c · pzt mod x0 only depend on the mi’s; therefore from the
zero-testing procedure one can extract a value that only depends on the mi’s.
2.2 The Approximate-GCD Problem and its Variant
The security of the CLT13 multilinear map scheme is based on the Approximate-GCD problem. For
a specific η-bit prime integer p, we use the following distribution over γ-bit integers:
Dγ,ρ(p) =
{
Choose q ← Z ∩ [0, 2γ/p), r ← Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ) : Output x = q · p+ r}
We also consider a noise-free x0 = q0 ·p where q0 is a random (γ−η)-bit prime integer (alternatively
the product of γ/η − 1 primes of size η bits each).
Definition 1 (Approximate-GCD problem with noise-free x0). For a random η-bit prime
integer p, given x0 = q0 · p and polynomially many samples from Dγ,ρ(p), output p.
We also consider the following variant, in which instead of being given elements from Dγ,ρ(p),
we get vectors of elements multiplied by a secret random invertible matrix K modulo x0.
Definition 2 (Vector Approximate-GCD problem with noise-free x0). For a random η-bit
prime integer p, generate x0 = q0 · p and a random invertible m ×m matrix K modulo x0. Given
x0 and polynomially many samples v˜ = v ·K mod x0 where v ← (Dγ,ρ(p))m, output p.
The vector variant of the Approximate-GCD problem cannot be easier than the original problem,
since any algorithm solving the vector variant can be used to solve the Approximate-GCD problem,
simply by generating vectors v˜ = v ·K (mod x0) for some random matrix K. However, the vector
variant could be harder to solve, so that smaller parameters could be used when dealing with the
Vector Approximate-GCD problem. We show in the next sections that the generalizations of the
attacks to the vector variant indeed have higher complexity.
In the context of the CLT13 scheme, one actually works with multiple primes pi’s. Therefore we
consider the multi-prime variant of the Approximate-GCD problem.
Definition 3 (Multi-prime Approximate-GCD problem). For n random η-bit prime integers
pi, let x0 =
∏n
i=1 pi. Given x0 and polynomially many integers cj = CRT(rij)i where rij ← Z ∩
(−2ρ, 2ρ), output the primes pi.
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Finally, we consider the vector variant of the multi-prime Approximate-GCD problem.
Definition 4 (Vector multi-prime Approximate-GCD problem). For n random η-bit prime
integers pi, let x0 =
∏n
i=1 pi. Let K be a random invertible m×m matrix modulo x0. Given x0 and
polynomially many vectors v˜ = v ·K mod x0, where v = (v1, . . . , vm) and vj = CRT(rij)i where
rij ← Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ), output the primes pi.
The two main approaches for solving the Approximate-GCD problem are the orthogonal lattice
attacks and the GCD attacks. We consider the orthogonal lattice attacks in Section 3, and the GCD
attacks in Section 4.
3 Lattice attack against the Approximate-GCD Problem
We first recall the lattice attack against the single-prime Approximate-GCD problem [DGHV10,
§B.1], based on the Nguyen-Stern orthogonal lattice attack [NS01]. As mentioned in introduction,
extending the attack to the multi-prime case is actually not straightforward; in particular, we
argue that the approach described in [CLT13] is incomplete and does not recover the primes pi’s,
except for small values of n. Therefore, we describe a new algorithm for solving the multi-prime
Approximate-GCD problem, using a variant of the Cheon et al. attack against CLT13. We then
extend the algorithm to the vector variant of the Approximate-GCD problem. Finally, we run our
attacks against both the multi-prime Approximate-GCD problem and the vector variant, in order
to derive concrete parameters for our construction. We provide the source code of our attacks in
[CP19].
3.1 The orthogonal lattice
We first recall the definition of the orthogonal lattice, following [NS97]. Let L be a lattice in Zm.
The orthogonal lattice L⊥ is defined as the set of elements in Zm which are orthogonal to all the
lattice points of L, for the usual dot product. We define the lattice L¯ = (L⊥)⊥; it is the intersection
of Zm with the Q-vector space generated by L; we have that L ⊂ L¯ and the determinant of L¯ divides
the determinant of L. We have that dim(L) + dim(L⊥) = m and det(L⊥) = det(L¯).
From Minkowski’s bound, we expect that a reduced basis of a “random” lattice L has short
vectors of norm ' (detL)1/dimL. For a “random” lattice L, we also expect that det(L) ' det(L¯) =
det(L⊥). Moreover, for a lattice L generated by a set of d “random” vectors bi ∈ Zm, from Hadamard
inequality we expect that detL ' ∏di=1 ‖bi‖. In that case, we therefore expect the short vectors of
L⊥ to have norm ' (detL⊥)1/(m−d) ' (detL)1/(m−d) ' (∏di=1 ‖bi‖)1/(m−d).
3.2 The classical orthogonal lattice attack against the single-prime
Approximate-GCD problem
In this section we recall the lattice attack against the Approximate-GCD problem, based on the
Nguyen-Stern orthogonal lattice attack [NS01]; see also the analysis in [DGHV10, §B.1]. We consider
a set of t integers xi = p · qi + ri and x0 = p · q0, for ri ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ) ∩ Z. We consider the lattice L of
vectors u that are orthogonal to x modulo x0, where x = (x1, . . . , xt):
L = {u ∈ Zt | u · x ≡ 0 (mod x0) }
The lattice L is of full rank t since it contains x0Zt. Moreover, we have
detL = [Zt : L] = x0/ gcd(x0, x1, . . . , xt) = x0.
Therefore, applying lattice reduction should yield a reduced basis (u1, . . . ,ut) with vectors of length
‖uk‖ ≤ 2ιt · (detL)1/t ≈ 2ιt+γ/t (6)
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where γ is the size of x0, for some constant ι > 0 depending on the lattice reduction algorithm,
where 2ιt is the Hermite factor.
Now given a vector u ∈ L, we have u · x ≡ 0 (mod x0), which implies that u · r ≡ 0 (mod p)
where r = (r1, . . . , rt). The main observation is that if u is short enough, the equality will hold
over Z. More precisely, if ‖u‖ · ‖r‖ < p, we get u · r = 0 in Z. From (6), this happens under the
condition:
2ιt+γ/t · 2ρ < 2η. (7)
In that case, the vectors (u1, . . . ,ut−1) from the previous lattice reduction step should be orthogonal
to the vector r. One can therefore recover ±r by computing the rank 1 lattice orthogonal to those
vectors. From r one can recover p by computing p = gcd(x0, x1 − r1).
Asymptotic complexity. We derive a heuristic lower bound for the complexity of the attack, as
in [DGHV10, §5.2]. From condition (7) the attack requires a minimal lattice dimension t > γ/η;
therefore from the same condition we must have
ι < η2/γ.
Achieving an Hermite factor of 2ιt heuristically requires at least 2Ω(1/ι) time, by using BKZ reduction
with block-size β = ω(1/ι) [HPS11]. Therefore, the orthogonal lattice attack has time complexity
at least 2Ω(γ/η
2).
3.3 Lattice attack against multi-prime Approximate GCD
We consider the setting of CLT13, that is we are given a modulus x0 =
∏n
i=1 pi and a set of integers
xj ∈ Zx0 such that
xj mod pi = rij
for rij ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ) ∩ Z, and the goal is to recover the secret primes pi.
First step: orthogonal lattice attack. As previously we consider the integer vector x formed by
the first t integers xj , and we consider the lattice L of vectors u that are orthogonal to x modulo
x0:
L = {u ∈ Zt | u · x ≡ 0 (mod x0) }
Note that the lattice L is of full rank t since it contains x0Zt. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let ri = x mod pi.
For any u ∈ Zt, if u · ri = 0 in Z for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then u · x ≡ 0 (mod x0). Therefore,
denoting by Lr the lattice generated by the vectors ri, the lattice L contains the sublattice L
⊥
r
of the vectors orthogonal in Z to the n vectors ri’s. Assuming that the n vectors ri’s are linearly
independent, we have dimL⊥r = t−n, and we expect a reduced basis of L⊥r to have vectors of norm
(
∏n
i=1 ‖ri‖)1/(t−n) ' 2ρ·n/(t−n).
Given a vector u ∈ L, we have u · x ≡ 0 (mod x0), which implies that u · ri ≡ 0 (mod pi) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. As previously, if u is short enough, the equalities will hold over Z. More precisely, if
‖u‖ · ‖ri‖ < pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we get u · ri = 0 in Z for all i; therefore we must have u ∈ L⊥r
under the condition ‖u‖ < (min pi)/(max ‖ri‖) ' 2η−ρ. Hence, when applying lattice reduction to
the lattice L, we expect to recover the vectors from the sublattice L⊥r if there is a gap of at least 2ι·t
between the short vectors in L⊥r and the other vectors in L \ L⊥r , where 2ι·t is the Hermite factor.
Since the vectors in L \ L⊥r must have norm at least approximately 2η−ρ, this gives the condition:
2ρ·n/(t−n) · 2ιt < 2η−ρ, (8)
In that case, applying lattice reduction to L should yield a reduced basis (u1, . . . , ut) where the
first t − n vectors belong to the sublattice L⊥r . By computing the rank n lattice orthogonal to
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those vectors, one recovers a basis B = (b1, . . . , bn) of the lattice L¯r = (L
⊥
r )
⊥, where Lr is the
lattice generated by the n vectors ri, However this does not necessarily reveal the original vectors
ri. Namely even by applying LLL or BKZ on the basis B, we do not necessarily recover the short
vectors ri’s, except possibly in low dimension; therefore the approach described in [CLT13] only
works when n is small.
However, the main observation is that since each vector bj of the basis B is a linear combination
of the vectors ri, it can play the same role as a zero-tested value in the CLT13 scheme. More
precisely, since the vectors b1, . . . , bn form a basis of L¯r, we can write for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
bj =
n∑
i=1
λjiri
for unknown coefficients λji ∈ Q. The above equation is analogous to Equation (5) on the zero-tested
value c ·pzt, which is a linear combination of the ri’s over Z when all mi’s are zero. Therefore, we can
apply a variant of the Cheon et al. attack to recover the primes pi’s, by computing the eigenvalues
of a well chosen matrix. Since we have n vectors bj instead of a single pzt value, we only need to
work with equations of degree 2 in the xj ’s, instead of degree 3 as in [CHL
+15].
Second step: algebraic attack. The second step of the attack is similar to the Cheon al. attack.
Recall that we receive as input x0 =
∏n
i=1 pi and a set of integers xj ∈ Zx0 such that xj mod pi = rij
for rij ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ) ∩ Z. Since we must work with an equation of degree 2 in the inputs, we consider
an additional integer y ∈ Zx0 with y mod pi = si with si ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ) ∩ Z for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We define the column vector x =
[
x1 . . . xn
]T
. Instead of running the orthogonal lattice attack
with x, we run the orthogonal lattice attack from the previous step with the column vector z of
dimension t = 2n defined as follows:
z =
[
x
y · x
]
Letting ri = x mod pi, this gives the column vectors for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
z mod pi =
[
ri
si · ri
]
We denote by Z the 2n× n matrix of column vectors z mod pi:
Z =
[
r1 · · · rn
s1 · r1 · · · sn · rn
]
=
[
R
R ·U
]
where R is the n× n matrix of column vectors ri, and U := diag(s1, . . . , sn).
By applying the orthogonal lattice attack of the first step on the known vector z, we obtain a
basis of the lattice intersection of Z2n with the Q-vector space generated by the n vectors z mod pi,
which corresponds to the columns of the matrix Z. Therefore we obtain two matrices W0 and W1
such that:
W0 = R ·A
W1 = R ·U ·A
for some unknown matrix A ∈ Qn×n. Therefore, as in the Cheon et al. attack, we compute the
matrix:
W = W1 ·W0−1 = R ·U ·R−1
and by computing the eigenvalues of W , one recovers the components si of the diagonal matrix U ,
from which we recover the pi’s by taking gcd’s. We provide the source code of the attack in [CP19].
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Asymptotic complexity. As previously, we derive a heuristic lower bound for the complexity of
the attack. The attack requires a lattice dimension t = 2n, and moreover the vectors ri have norm
' 22ρ instead of 2ρ; therefore condition (8) gives 4ρ+ 2ιn < η which implies the condition
ι <
η
2n
.
Achieving an Hermite factor of 2ιt heuristically requires 2Ω(1/ι) time, by using BKZ reduction with
block-size β = ω(1/ι) [HPS11]. Therefore, the orthogonal lattice attack has time complexity at least
2Ω(n/η). Note that with γ = η · n, we get the same time complexity lower bound 2Ω(γ/η2) as for the
single-prime Approximate-GCD problem. Finally, as shown in [CLT13], to prevent the orthogonal
lattice attack, one must take:
n = ω(η log λ) (9)
Namely, in that case there exists a function c(λ) such that n(λ) = c(λ)η(λ) log2 λ with c(λ) → ∞
for λ→∞. With a time complexity at least 2k·n/η for some k > 0, the time complexity is therefore
at least 2k·c(λ) log2 λ = λk·c(λ). This implies that the attack is not polynomial time under Condition
9.
3.4 Lattice attack against the Vector Approximate-GCD Problem
In this section we extend the previous orthogonal lattice attack to the vector variant of the Approximate-
GCD problem with multiple primes pi’s. We still consider a modulus x0 =
∏n
i=1 pi, but instead of
scalar values xj , we consider t row vectors vj , each with m components (vj)k, such that:
(vj)k = rijk (mod pi)
for all components 1 ≤ k ≤ m and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where rijk ∈ (−2ρ, 2ρ) ∩ Z. We consider the t×m
matrix V of row vectors vj . We don’t publish the matrix V directly; instead we first generate a
random secret m×m invertible matrix K modulo x0 and publish the t×m matrix:
V˜ = V ·K (mod x0)
The goal is to recover the primes pi’s as in the previous attack.
Actually, we cannot solve the original multi-prime vector Approximate-GCD problem directly,
since the algebraic step of the attack requires degree 2 equations in the inputs. Instead, we assume
that we can additionally obtain two m×m matrices:
C˜0 = K
−1 ·C0 ·K′ (mod x0)
C˜1 = K
−1 ·C1 ·K′ (mod x0)
for some random invertible matrix K′ modulo x0, where the components of the matrices C0,C1 ∈
Zm×mx0 are small modulo each pi. This assumption is verified in our construction of Section 5.
First step: orthogonal lattice attack. In our extended attack we consider the lattice L of vectors
u that are orthogonal to all columns of V˜ modulo x0:
L = {u ∈ Zt | u · V˜ ≡ 0 (mod x0) }
Since the matrix K is invertible, we obtain:
L = {u ∈ Zt | u · V ≡ 0 (mod x0) } (10)
The lattice L is of full rank t since it contains x0Zt. Let Ri = V mod pi. As previously, the lattice
L contains the sublattice L′ of dimension t−m ·n of the vectors orthogonal in Z to the m ·n column
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vectors in Ri for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We expect a reduced basis of L′ to have vectors of norm ' 2ρ·m·n/(t−m·n).
Therefore, applying lattice reduction to L should yield a reduced basis (u1, . . . ,ut) where the first
t−m · n vectors belong to the sublattice L′, under the modified condition:
2ιt+ρ·m·n/(t−m·n) < 2η−ρ (11)
As previously, by computing the rank n ·m lattice orthogonal to the vectors (u1, . . . ,ut−m·n), we
obtain a basis of the lattice intersection of Zt with the Q-vector space generated by the column
vectors of the Ri’s.
Second step: algebraic attack. Considering the original t×m matrix V˜ and using t = nm rows:
V˜ = V ·K (mod x0)
we can obtain the two nm×m matrices:
D˜0 = V˜ · C˜0 = V ·C0 ·K′ = D0 ·K′ (mod x0)
D˜1 = V˜ · C˜1 = V ·C1 ·K′ = D1 ·K′ (mod x0)
where D0 = V ·C0 and D1 = V ·C1.
Instead of applying the lattice attack with V˜ , we apply the lattice attack of the first step to the
2nm×m matrix D˜ =
[
D˜0
D˜1
]
, with t = 2nm rows. Since D˜ = D ·K′ where D =
[
D0
D1
]
, this is the
same as applying the lattice attack against the matrix D. As previously, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we let
Ri = V mod pi, and we let S0,i = C0 mod pi and S1,i = C1 mod pi. This gives:
D mod pi =
[
V ·C0 mod pi
V ·C1 mod pi
]
=
[
Ri · S0,i
Ri · S1,i
]
We denote by E the 2nm × nm matrix obtained by concatenating the columns of D mod pi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Similarly we denote by R the nm× nm matrix obtained by concatenating the columns
of the matrices Ri. We denote by Sˆ0 the nm×nm block-diagonal matrix Sˆ0 = diag(S0,1, . . . ,S0,n),
and similarly Sˆ1 = diag(S1,1, . . . ,S1,n). We can write:
E =
[
R1 · S0,1 · · · Rn · S0,n
R1 · S1,1 · · · Rn · S1,n
]
=
[
R · Sˆ0
R · Sˆ1
]
By applying the orthogonal lattice attack of the first step on the matrix D˜, we obtain as
previously a basis of the lattice intersection of Z2nm with the Q-vector space generated by the nm
columns of the matrices D mod pi, which corresponds to the columns of the matrix E. Therefore
as previously we obtain two matrices W 0 and W 1 such that:
W 0 = R · Sˆ0 ·A
W 1 = R · Sˆ1 ·A
for some unknown matrix A ∈ Qnm×nm. Therefore we can compute the matrix:
W = W 1 ·W−10 = R · Sˆ1 · Sˆ−10 R−1
The characteristic polynomial f(X) of W is therefore the same as the characteristic polynomial
of Sˆ1·Sˆ−10 which is the product of the n characteristic polynomials fi(X) of the matrices S1,i·S−10,i . By
the Cayley-Hamilton theorem, we must have fi(S1,i ·S−10,i ) = 0 for all i, which implies fi(C1 ·C−10 ) =
0 (mod pi), which also implies fi(C˜1 · C˜−10 ) = 0 (mod pi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, if the
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polynomials fi(X) are irreducible, they can be recovered by computing f(X) and factoring f(X)
into irreducible polynomials; then each prime pi can be recovered by computing the gcd of the
entries of M i = fi(C˜1 · C˜−10 ) mod x0 with x0. We provide the source code of the attack in [CP19].
Alternatively, if the polynomials fi(X) are not irreducible, one can still factor f(X) into monic
irreducible factors f ′1, . . . , f ′N ∈ Q[X]. Then for k ∈ [N ], the attacker defines Fk := f/f ′k ∈ Q[X]
and Gk = Fk · dk ∈ Z[X], where dk is the common denominator of Fk’s coefficients. Since in Fk
we have removed one irreducible factor from f , by the Cayley-Hamilton theorem we have that
Gk(C˜1 · C˜−10 ) = 0 modulo all primes except one, and therefore the remaining prime pi can be
recovered by computing the gcd of the entries of Mk = Gk(C˜1 · C˜−10 ) mod x0 with x0.
Asymptotic complexity. As previously, we derive a heuristic lower bound for the complexity of
the attack. Since the attack requires a lattice dimension t = 2mn, condition (11) with noise size 2ρ
instead of ρ gives 4ρ+ 2ιmn < η which gives the new condition
ι <
η
2mn
Therefore, the orthogonal lattice attack has time complexity at least 2Ω(n·m/η). This implies that
to prevent the orthogonal lattice attack, we must have:
n = ω
( η
m
log λ
)
Compared to the original condition of [CLT13] recalled by (9), the value of n can therefore be
divided by m. This implies that the encoding size γ = η · n can also be divided by m. We show in
Section 7 that this brings a significant improvement in practice.
3.5 Practical experiments and concrete parameters
Practical experiments. We have run our two attacks from sections 3.3 and 3.4 against the multi-
prime approximate-GCD problem and its vector variant; we provide the source code in [CP19]. We
summarize the running times for various values of n in tables 2 and 3. We see that the running time
of the lattice step in the vector variant is roughly the same as in the non-vector variant, when the
number of primes n is divided by m in the vector variant. This confirms the asymptotic analysis
of the previous section. For the algebraic step of the non-vector problem, it is significantly more
efficient to compute the matrix kernel and eigenvalues modulo some arbitrary prime integer q of
size η, instead of over the rationals.
n η ρ lat. dim. Time LLL Time alg.
20 335 80 40 1.5 s 0.6 s
30 335 80 60 9 s 0.7 s
40 335 80 80 37 s 1.5 s
60 335 80 120 4 min 4 s
80 335 80 160 20 min 8 s
Table 2. Running time of the LLL step and the algebraic step for solving the multi-prime Approximate-GCD problem,
on a 3.2 GHz Intel Core i5.
LLL and BKZ practical complexity. To derive concrete parameters for our construction from
Section 5, we have run more experiments with LLL and BKZ lattice reduction algorithms applied to
a lattice similar to the lattice L of the previous section. Recall that we must apply lattice reduction
on the lattice:
L = {u ∈ Zt | u · V˜ ≡ 0 (mod x0) }
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n m η ρ lat. dim. Time LLL Time alg.
4 5 335 80 40 1.4 s 2.3 s
8 5 335 80 80 32 s 2 min
12 5 335 80 120 4 min 6 min
16 5 335 80 160 12 min 12 min
20 5 335 80 200 44 min 37 min
Table 3. Running time of the LLL step and the algebraic step for solving the vector multi-prime Approximate-GCD
problem, on a 3.2 GHz Intel Core i5.
with t = 2nm. We write u = [u1,u2] with u1 ∈ Zt−m and u2 ∈ Zm. Similarly we write V˜ =
[
A
W
]
where W is a m ×m matrix. With high probability W is invertible modulo x0, otherwise we can
partially factor x0. We obtain
u ∈ L ⇐⇒ u1A+ u2W ≡ 0 (mod x0)
⇐⇒ u1AW−1 + u2 ≡ 0 (mod x0)
Therefore, a basis of L is given by the matrix of row vectors:
L =
[
It−m −AW−1
x0Im
]
For simplicity, we have performed our experiments on a simpler lattice:
L′ =
[
It−m A′
x0Im
]
where the components of A′ are randomly generated modulo x0. We expect to obtain a reduced
basis (u1, . . . ,ut) with vectors of norm:
‖uk‖ ' 2ι·t(detL)1/t ' 2ι·t+m·γ/t
where 2ι·t is the Hermite factor, and γ the size of x0. Experimentally, we observed the following
running time (expressed in number of clock cycles) for the LLL lattice reduction algorithm in the
Sage implementation:
TLLL(t, γ,m) ' 2 · t3.3 · γ ·m (12)
The Sage implementation also includes an implementation of BKZ 2.0 [CN11]. Experimentally we
observed the following running-times (in number of clock cycles):
TBKZ(t, β) ' b(β) · t4.3 (13)
where the observed constant b(β) and the Hermite factor are given in Table 4. However we were
not able to obtain experimental results for block-sizes β > 60, so for BKZ-80 and BKZ-100 we used
extrapolated values, assuming that the cost of BKZ sieving with blocksize β is poly(t) · 20.292β+◦(β)
(see [BDGL16]). The Hermite factors for BKZ-80 and BKZ-100 are from [CN11].
Setting concrete parameters. When applying LLL or BKZ with blocksize β on the original
lattice L, we obtain an orthogonal vector u under the condition (11), which gives with t = 2nm
and vectors with noise size 2ρ instead of ρ:
ι · 2nm+ 4ρ < η (14)
Therefore we must run LLL or BKZ-β with a large enough blocksize β so that ι is small enough for
condition (14) to hold. For security parameter λ, we require that
Tlat(t, γ) ≥ 2λ,
with t = 2nm, where the running time (in number of clock cycles) Tlat(t, γ) is given by (12) or (13),
for γ = η · n. We use that condition to provide concrete parameters for our scheme in Section 7.
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LLL BKZ-60 BKZ-80 BKZ-100
(Hermite factor)1/t = 2ι 1.021 1.011 1.01 1.009
Running time parameter b(β) − 103 6 · 104 3 · 106
Table 4. Experimental values of running time and Hermite factor for LLL and BKZ as a function of the blocksize β.
The parameters for β = 80, 100 are extrapolated.
4 GCD Attacks against the Approximate-GCD Problem and its Variants
4.1 The Naive GCD Attack.
For simplicity we first consider the single prime variant of the Approximate-GCD problem. More
precisely, we consider x0 = q0 · p and an encoding c with
c ≡ r (mod p),
where r is a small integer of size ρ bits. The naive GCD attack, which has complexity O(2ρ), consists
in performing an exhaustive search of r and computing gcd(c− r, x0) to obtain the factor p.
4.2 The Chen-Nguyen Attack
At Eurocrypt 2012, Chen and Nguyen described an improved attack based on multipoint polynomial
evaluation [CN12], with complexity O˜(2ρ/2). One starts from the equation:
p = gcd
(
x0,
2ρ−1∏
i=0
(c− i) (mod x0)
)
(15)
The main observation is that the above product modulo x0 can be written as the product of 2
ρ/2
evaluations of a single polynomial of degree 2ρ/2. Using a tree structure, it is possible to evaluate a
polynomial of degree 2ρ/2 at 2ρ/2 points in O˜(2ρ/2) time and memory, instead of O(2ρ).
More precisely, one can define the following polynomial f(x) of degree 2ρ/2, with coefficients
modulo x0; we assume for simplicity that ρ is even:
f(x) =
2ρ/2−1∏
i=0
(c− (x+ i)) mod x0
One can then rewrite (15) as the product of 2ρ/2 evaluations of the polynomial f(x):
p = gcd
x0, 2ρ/2−1∏
k=0
f(2ρ/2k) (mod x0)

There are classical algorithms which can evaluate a polynomial f(x) of degree d at d points,
using at most O˜(d) operations in the coefficient ring; see for example [Ber03]. The technique is
as follows. First, one must compute the coefficients of the polynomial f(x); using a product tree,
the product of the d = 2ρ/2 factors can be computed in time O˜(d). Secondly, one must compute
the evaluation of f(x) at d points x1, . . . , xd. This can also be performed in time O˜(d) using a
remainder tree. The basic observation is that the evaluation of f(x) at the first half x1, . . . , xd/2 is
equal to the evaluation of the degree d/2 polynomial fl(x) = f(x) mod (x − x1) · · · (x − xd/2) on
x1, . . . , xd/2. Therefore the evaluation of f(x) can proceed with a recursive algorithm. First compute
the left polynomial fl(x) = f(x) mod (x−x1) · · · (x−xd/2); the computation of (x−x1) · · · (x−xd/2)
can be done in time O˜(d) with a product tree, and the remainder can also be computed in time
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O˜(d). Proceed similarly with the right polynomial fr(x) = f(x) mod (x−xd/2+1) · · · (x−xd). Then
recursively evaluate fl(x) and fr(x) on the two halves with d/2 points each. It is easy to see that the
full algorithm has time and memory complexity O˜(d). Therefore, the Chen-Nguyen Attack has time
and memory complexity O˜(2ρ/2). We provide in [CP19] an implementation of the Chen-Nguyen
attack in Sage; our running time is similar to [CN12, Table 1]; see Table 5 below for practical
experiments. In practice, the running time in number of clock cycles of the Chen-Nguyen attack
with a γ-bit x0 is well approximated by:
TCN (ρ, γ) = 0.3 · ρ2 · 2ρ/2 · γ · log2 γ (16)
4.3 The Lee-Seo Attack
The Chen-Nguyen attack was later extended by Lee and Seo at Crypto 2014 [LS14], when the
encodings are multiplicatively masked by a random secret z modulo x0, as it is the case in the
CLT13 scheme; their attack has the same complexity O˜(2ρ/2). Namely in the asymmetric CLT13
scheme recalled in Section 2.1, an encoding c at level set {i0} is such that:
c ≡ ri · gi +mi
zi0
(mod pi)
for some random secret zi0 modulo x0. Therefore, we consider the following variant of the Approxima-
te-GCD problem. Instead of being given encodings ci with ci ≡ ri (mod p) for small ri’s, we are
given encodings ci with:
ci ≡ ri · z (mod p)
for some random integer z modulo x0, where the ri’s are still ρ-bit integers. Since c1/c2 ≡ r1/r2
(mod p), the naive GCD attack consists in guessing r1 and r2 and computing p = gcd(c1/c2 −
r1/r2 mod x0, x0), with complexity O(22ρ).
The Lee-Seo attack with complexity O˜(2ρ/2) is as follows. First, one generates two lists L1 and
L2 of such encodings, and we look for a collision modulo p between those two lists; such collision
will appear with good probability when the size of the two lists is at least 2ρ/2. More precisely, let
ci be the elements of L1 and dj be the elements of L2, with ci ≡ ri · z (mod p) and dj = sj · z
(mod p). If ri = sj for some pair (i, j), then ci ≡ dj (mod p) and therefore:
p = gcd
∏
i,j
(ci − dj) mod x0, x0

where the product is over all ci ∈ L1 and dj ∈ L2. A naive computation of this product would take
time |L1| · |L2| = 2ρ; however, as in the Chen-Nguyen attack, this product can be computed in time
and memory O˜(2ρ/2). Namely one can define the polynomial
f(x) =
∏
i
(ci − x) mod x0
of degree |L1| = 2ρ/2 and the previous equation can be rewritten:
p = gcd
∏
j
f(dj) mod x0, x0

This corresponds to the multipoint evaluation of the degree 2ρ/2 polynomial f(x) at the 2ρ/2 points
of the list L2; therefore, this can be computed in time and memory O˜(2ρ/2).
As observed in [LS14], if only a small set of elements ci is available (much less than 2
ρ/2), one
can still generate exponentially more ci’s by using small linear integer combinations of the original
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ci’s, and the above attack still applies, with only a slight increase in the noise ρ. We provide in
[CP19] an implementation of the Lee-Seo attack in Sage. Its running time is roughly the same as
Chen-Nguyen, except that the attack is probabilistic only; its success probability can be increased
by taking slightly larger lists L1 and L2 to improve the collision probability.
4.4 GCD Attack against the Vector Approximate GCD Problem
We now consider the Vector Approximate-GCD problem (Definition 2). We consider a set of row
vectors vi of dimension m, such that for each vector vi, all components (vi)j of vi are small modulo
p:
(vi)j = rij (mod p)
However, we only obtain the randomized vectors:
v˜i = vi ·K (mod x0)
for some random invertible matrix K modulo x0. The goal is still to recover the prime p.
Our attack is similar to the Lee-Seo attack recalled previously. We only consider the first com-
ponent ci = (v˜i)1 of each vector v˜i. We have:
ci = (v˜i)1 =
m∑
j=1
(vi)j ·Kj1 =
m∑
j=1
rij ·Kj1 (mod p)
We build the two lists L1 and L2 from the ci’s as in the Lee-Seo attack. Since each ci is a linear
combination modulo p of m random values rij ’s (where the coefficients are initially generated at
random modulo p), it has m·ρ bits of entropy modulo p, instead of ρ in the Lee-Seo attack. Therefore
a collision between the two lists will occur with good probability when the lists have size at least
2m·ρ/2. This implies that the attack has time and memory complexity O˜(2m·ρ/2). Note that the
entropy of each ci modulo p is actually upper-bounded by the bitsize η of p. If m · ρ > η, the attack
complexity becomes O˜(2η/2), which corresponds to the complexity of the Pollard’s rho factoring
algorithm. We provide in [CP19] an implementation of the attack in Sage; see Table 5 below for
practical experiments.
With an attack complexity O˜(2mρ/2) instead of O˜(2ρ/2), one can therefore divide the size of
the noise ρ by a factor m compared to the original CLT13, which is a significant improvement.
For example, it is recommended in [CLT13] to take ρ = 89 bits for λ = 80 bits of security; with
a vector dimension m = 10, one can now take ρ = 9 for the same level of security. Note that we
can take m · ρ/2 < λ because we only require that the running time in number of clock-cycles is
at least 2λ. More precisely, the running time can be approximated by TCN (mρ, γ) for a γ-bit x0,
where TCN (ρ, γ) is given by (16), and we require TCN (mρ, γ) ≥ 2λ.
With matrices. The previous GCD attack can be generalized to m ×m matrices Vi instead of
m-dimensional vectors vi. More precisely, we consider a set of matrices Vi of dimension m×m with
small components modulo p, that is:
(Vi)jk = rijk (mod p) (17)
for ρ-bit integers rijk. As previously, instead of publishing the matrices Vi, we publish the random-
ized matrices
V˜i = K · Vi ·K′ (mod x0) (18)
for two random invertible m×m matrices K and K′ modulo x0. In that case, each component of
V˜i depends on the m
2 elements of the matrix Vi. This implies that the entropy of each component
of V˜i is now m
2 · ρ and therefore the GCD attack has complexity O˜(2m2·ρ/2).
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Formally, using the Kronecker product(see Appendix A), we can rewrite (18) as
vec (V˜i) = (K
′T ⊗K) vec (Vi),
where vec (Vi) denotes the column vector of dimension m
2 formed by stacking the columns of Vi
on top of one another, and similarly for vec (V˜i). We can therefore apply the previous attack with
vectors of dimension m2 instead of m; the attack complexity is therefore O˜(2m2·ρ/2). This implies
that we can divide the noise size ρ by a factor m2 compared to [CLT13], where m is the matrix
dimension. We provide in [CP19] an implementation of the attack in Sage; see Table 5 below for
practical experiments.
With multiple primes pi’s. Instead of considering an encoding c that is small modulo a single
prime p, we consider as in CLT13 a modulus x0 =
∏n
i=1 pi and an integer c ∈ Zx0 such that
c mod pi = ri
for ρ-bit integers ri. With good probability, we have |ri| ≤ 2ρ/n for some i but not all i, and
Equation (15) from the Chen-Nguyen attack can be rewritten:
pi| gcd
x0, b2ρ/nc∏
j=0
(c− j) (mod x0)

where the gcd is not equal to x0; therefore a sub-product of the pi’s is revealed. Since the number
of terms in the product is divided by n, the complexity of the Chen-Nguyen attack for recovering
a single pi (or a sub-product of the pi’s) is divided by
√
n. By repeating the same attack n times
in different intervals of the ri’s, one can recover all the pi’s; the running time of the Chen-Nguyen
attack is then increased by a factor
√
n.
Similarly, in the Lee-Seo attack with multiple primes pi’s, the collision probability for recovering
a single pi is multiplied by n, and therefore the attack complexity is divided by
√
n for recovering
a single pi. The same applies to our variant attack against the Vector Approximate GCD problem
and to the matrix variant. In the later case, with noise size ρm, the running time of the attack in
number of clock cycles can therefore be approximated by
TGCD(m, γ, ρm, n) = TCN (ρ, γ)/
√
n (19)
with ρ = m2ρm. We will use that approximation to provide concrete parameters for our scheme in
Section 7.
AGCD: Chen-Nguyen
ρ 12 16 20 24
time (s) 0.3 2.5 15 94
m-vector AGCD: our attack (m = 4)
ρv 3 4 5 6
time (s) 1.5 9.3 53 301
m×m-matrix AGCD: our attack (m = 2) ρm 3 4 5 6
time (s) 1.5 10 54 300
Table 5. Running time of the Chen-Nguyen attack against the Approximate-GCD problem and our attack against
the vector variant and matrix variants with η = 100 and x0 of size γ = 16 000, on a 3.2 GHz Intel Core i5.
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Practical experiments. We provide in Table 5 the result of practical experiments against the
Approximate-GCD problem and its vector variant with a single prime p. We see that our attack
against the vector variant with dimension m and noise size ρv has roughly the same running time
as the Chen-Nguyen attack on the original problem with noise ρ = m · ρv; similarly, the running
time of our attack against m × m matrices with noise ρm has roughly the same running time as
Chen-Nguyen with noise ρ = m2 · ρm; this confirms the above analysis. We provide the source code
in [CP19].
5 Our Construction
In this section we describe our construction of a non-interactive multipartite Diffie-Hellman key
exchange scheme based on the CLT13 multilinear maps. We first recall the definition of such a
scheme.
5.1 Non-interactive Multipartite Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
A multipartite key exchange protocol aims to derive a shared value between N parties. This is
achieved via a procedure in which the parties broadcast some values and then use some secret
information together with the values broadcasted by the other parties to set up the shared key. In
a non-interactive protocol, the parties broadcast their public values only once and at the same time
(or equivalently, the values broadcasted by each party do not depend on the values broadcasted by
the others). Following the notation of [BS03], such protocol can be described with three randomized
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms as follows.
– Setup(1λ, N): This algorithm runs in polynomial time in the security parameter λ ∈ N and in
the number of parties N , and outputs the public parameters params.
– Publish(params, u): Given a party u ∈ [N ], this algorithm generates a pair of keys (sku, pku).
Party u broadcasts pku and keeps sku secret.
– KeyGen(params, v, skv, {pku}u6=v): Party v ∈ [N ] uses its secret skv and all the values pku broad-
casted by other parties to generate a session key sv.
We say that the protocol is correct if s = s1 = s2 = · · · = sN , i.e., if all the parties share the same
value at the end. We say that the protocol is secure if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
can distinguish the shared value s from a random string given the public parameters params and
the broadcasted values pk1, . . . , pkN .
5.2 Our Construction
We describe our N -party one-round key exchange protocol. We start with the Setup procedure,
which is run a single time by a trusted authority to generate the public parameters. As illustrated
in Table 6, Setup generates for each party v two sequences of matrices (C
(v)
i,b )i=1,...,` for b ∈ {0, 1}.
In the KeyGen procedure, each party v will use the product of the matrices C
(v)
i,b on his row v to
generate the session-key. The product is computed according to the secret-key skv of Party v and the
secret-keys sku of the other parties. Therefore, in the Publish procedure, each party u will compute
and publish the partial sub-products corresponding to his sku on the other rows v 6= u, to be used
by each party v on his row v.
Setup(1λ, N): given a security parameter λ and the number of participants N , we set the length
µ of each parties’ secret, the number of repetitions k, and the dimension m of the matrices, with
m ≡ 0 (mod 3). We then instantiate the CLT13 multilinear map with degree of multilinearity `+ 2
with ` := µNk. Let g =
∏n
i=1 gi be the integer defining the message space Zg. Let ν be the number
of high-order bits that can be extracted from a zero-tested value.
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Party 1
C
(1)
1,0 C
(1)
2,0 . . . C
(1)
`,0
C
(1)
1,1 C
(1)
2,1 . . . C
(1)
`,1
Party 2
C
(2)
1,0 C
(2)
2,0 . . . C
(2)
`,0
C
(2)
1,1 C
(2)
2,1 . . . C
(2)
`,1
Party 3
C
(3)
1,0 C
(3)
2,0 . . . C
(3)
`,0
C
(3)
1,1 C
(3)
2,1 . . . C
(3)
`,1
Table 6. Public matrices for N = 3 generated during the Setup procedure.
To ensure that all users 1 ≤ u ≤ N compute the same session-key, we define A(u)i,b as a larger
matrix embedding a matrix Bi,b that is the same for all users, with some random block padding in
the diagonal and the multiplicative bundling scalars α
(u)
i,b to prevent the adversary from switching
the corresponding bits bi’s between the k repetitions of the secret keys:
A
(u)
i,b ∼

$ . . . $
...
. . .
...
$ . . . $
$ . . . $
...
. . .
...
$ . . . $
α
(u)
i,b ·Bi,b

(20)
More precisely, we first sample 2` random invertible matrices Bi,b in Zm
′×m′
g where m
′ = m/3,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` and b ∈ {0, 1}. For each u ∈ [N ], we additionally sample 2`N scalars α(u)i,b in Z?g and
4`N random invertible matrices S
(u)
i,b and T
(u)
i,b in Z
m′×m′
g , for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` and b ∈ {0, 1}. As illustrated
in (20), we let
A
(u)
i,b := diag(S
(u)
i,b , T
(u)
i,b , α
(u)
i,b ·Bi,b) (21)
The scalars α
(u)
i,b must satisfy the following condition:
∀u, v ∈ [N ],∀i ∈ [Nµ],∀b ∈ {0, 1},
k−1∏
j=0
α
(u)
j·N ·µ+i−1,b =
k−1∏
j=0
α
(v)
j·N ·µ+i−1,b (mod g)
In addition, we sample the vectors s∗, t∗ uniformly from Zm′g , and for each u ∈ [N ] we define a left
bookend vector
s(u) := (0, . . . , 0, $, . . . , $, s∗) ∈ Zmg
where the block of 0’s and the block of randoms have the same length m′ = m/3 as s∗, and similarly
a right bookend vector t(u) := ($, . . . , $, 0, . . . , 0, t∗) ∈ Zmg .
We let A˜
(u)
i,b ∈ Zm×mx0 be the matrix obtained by encoding each entry of A
(u)
i,b independently.
Similarly we encode s(u) and t(u) entry-wise, obtaining s˜(u) and t˜(u). For each u ∈ [N ], we sample
uniformly random invertible matrices K
(u)
i ∈ Zm×mx0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ `. We then use Kilian’s randomiza-
tion “on the encoding side” and define:
C
(u)
i,b := K
(u)
i−1A˜
(u)
i,b
(
K
(u)
i
)−1
(mod x0)
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Similarly, we define s¯(u) := s˜(u)
(
K
(u)
0
)−1
(mod x0) and t¯
(u) := K
(u)
` t˜
(u)pzt (mod x0). Note that
thanks to Kilian’s randomization “on the encoding side”, the matrices A
(u)
i,b can be encoded with
denominator zj = 1 in (4) for all levels j; namely we obtain the same distribution in the final C
(u)
i,b as
with random zj ’s. Finally we output params, which is defined as the set containing all the matrices
C
(u)
i,b , the bookend vectors s¯
(u) and t¯(u), and the scalars µ, k,N, `, x0, ν and m.
Publish(params, u): Party u samples a bit string sk(u) ∈ {0, 1}µ and for each v ∈ [N ] such that u 6= v,
Party u computes k products using matrices from the row of party v. This ensures that from the
extraction procedure of the multilinear map scheme, each user u can derive the session key from
his own sk(u) by computing on his row u the partial products corresponding to his sk(u), combined
with the published partial matrix products from the other users. More precisely, Party u computes
and broadcasts the following products:
D(u→v)r :=
µ−1∏
i=0
C
(v)
(r−1)Nµ+(u−1)µ+i,sk(u)[i] (mod x0) (22)
for each v 6= u and r ∈ [k]. The notation u → v stands for “computed by u to be used by v”. We
let pku = {D(u→v)r : v ∈ [N ], v 6= u, r ∈ [k]}.
KeyGen(params, v, sk(v), {pku}u6=v): Using secret sk(v), party v computes the products D(v→v)r for all
r ∈ [k] using (22), and then the product
z(v) := s¯(v)
(
k∏
r=1
(
N∏
u=1
D(u→v)r
))
t¯(v) (mod x0). (23)
Eventually the shared key is obtained by applying a strong randomness extractor to the ν most-
significant bits of z(v). This terminates the description of our construction.
Correctness. It is easy to verify the correctness of our construction. Namely defining sk as the
concatenated secret-keys with the k repetitions:
sk = (sk(1), . . . , sk(N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
First repetition
, . . . , sk(1), . . . , sk(N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k-th repetition
) (24)
we obtain from (22) and (23), and then from the cancellation of Kilian’s randomization on the
encoding side:
z(v) = s¯(v)
(∏`
i=1
C
(v)
i,sk[i]
)
t¯(v) = s˜(v)
(∏`
i=1
A˜
(v)
i,sk[i]
)
t˜(v)pzt (mod x0).
This corresponds to a zero-tested encoding of:
vv = s
(v) ·
(∏`
i=1
A
(v)
i,sk[i]
)
· t(v) = s∗ ·
(∏`
i=1
α
(v)
i,sk[i]
)
·
(∏`
i=1
Bi,sk[i]
)
· t∗ (mod g)
From the condition satisfied by the α
(v)
i,b ’s, the products
∏`
i=1 α
(v)
i,sk[i] are independent from v. There-
fore, each party v will extract from z(v) the same session-key, as required.
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5.3 Additional safeguard: straddling sets
As an additional safeguard one can use the straddling set systems from [BGK+14]. Like the mul-
tiplicative bundling scalars α
(u)
i,b , this prevents the adversary from switching the secret-key bits
between the k repetitions. Additionally, the straddling set system prevents the adversary from mix-
ing the matrices A˜
(u)
i,0 and A˜
(u)
i,1 , since in that case the matrices are encoded at a different level
set.
6 The Cheon et al. Attack and its Generalization using Tensor Products
At Eurocrypt 2015, Cheon et al. described in [CHL+15] a total break of the basic key-exchange
protocol of CLT13. The attack was then extended and applied to several constructions based on
CLT13. In this section, we argue that the complexity of the Cheon et al. attack against our con-
struction is Ω(m2k−1), where m is the matrix dimension and k the number of repetitions. Therefore,
the Cheon et al. attack is prevented by using a large enough k.
6.1 The original Cheon et al. attack
The Cheon et al. attack [CHL+15] against CLT13 consists in multiplying the level-one encodings of
zero available in the original CLT13 by other encodings to obtain top-level encodings of zero, which
are then zero-tested to provide equations over Z instead of Zx0 ; the attack recovers all secret primes
p1, . . . , pn from the public parameters.
More precisely, given level-one encodings of zero ai (for i ∈ [n]), level-one encodings cj (for
j ∈ [n]) and a level-zero encoding b0, assuming only κ = 2 levels, the attacker defines wi,j :=
[ai · b0 · cj · pzt]x0 and w′i,j := [ai · cj · pzt]x0 , and then computes two matrices W0,W1 ∈ Zn×nx0 whose
entries are defined as W0[i, j] := wi,j and W1[i, j] := w
′
i,j .
From the definition of pzt, we obtain wi,j =
∑n
k=1 ai,kb0,kcj,kξk (mod x0), where ai,k, b0,k and cj,k
represent the modulo pk component of the numerator of ai, b0, and cj respectively, and ξk gathers
the terms from pzt. Since we obtain encodings of zero, the equation also holds over Z, hence it can
be rewritten as
wi,j = [ai,1 ai,2 . . . ai,n] ·

ξ1b0,1
ξ2b0,2
. . .
ξnb0,n
 ·

cj,1
cj,2
...
cj,n
 .
Therefore we can write W0 = AB0C, where the rows of A are the vectors in the left (for i ∈ [n]),
B0 is the diagonal matrix in the middle, and C is the matrix whose columns are the vectors in the
right (for j ∈ [n]). By the same argument, W1 = AB1C, where B1 = diag(ξ1, . . . , ξn). Thus, the
attacker can compute over Q:
W = W0W1
−1 = (AB0C)(AB1C)−1 = AB0B−11 A
−1
The eigenvalues of W are the same as those of B0B
−1
1 and are equal to b0,1, . . . , b0,n. The attacker
can therefore recover the b0,i’s and eventually the primes pi’s by computing gcd’s. We provide an
implementation of the attack in [CP19].
Variant modulo q. Since the eigenvalues b0,i are small, they can be computed modulo a small
prime q of size η bits. Therefore it suffices to compute the matrix W0W1
−1 modulo q only. The
characteristic polynomial of W0W1
−1 is computed modulo q and then factored to recover the b0,i’s
modulo q. Experimentally, computing the two matrices W0 and W1 takes time O(n3.5). Computing
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the full W0W1
−1 over Q takes time O(n6), whereas computing W0W1−1 mod q and recovering the
eigenvalues modulo q takes only O(n3). Therefore the variant attack modulo q is much faster, and
its dominant cost is to compute the two matrices W0 and W1. We also provide an implementation
of the variant in [CP19].
6.2 Generalization to matrices
The previous attack was extended to matrices of encodings in [CGH+15]. More precisely, the ex-
tended attack defines an attack set of dimension d as 3 sets of matrices A := {Ai ∈ Zd×dx0 : i ∈ [nd]},
B = {Bσ ∈ Zd×dx0 : σ ∈ {0, 1}}, and C := {Cj ∈ Zd×dx0 : j ∈ [nd]}, and two vectors s ∈ Zdx0 and
t ∈ Zdx0 such that the value wi,σ,j := sAiBσCjt (mod x0) is a zero-tested top-level encoding of zero.
The attack then proceeds as previously by computing two matrices W σ ∈ Znd×nd (for σ ∈ {0, 1})
whose each entry is defined as W σ[i, j] = wi,σ,j , then computing the matrix W := W0W1
−1 over
Q. As previously we can write:
W σ = AB¯σC
where the matrix B¯σ of dimension nd is block-diagonal with the matrices ξi · (Bσ mod pi) ∈ Zd×d
on the diagonal. We obtain:
W = W0W1
−1 = AB¯0B¯−11 A
−1
The characteristic polynomial f(X) ofW is the same as the characteristic polynomial of B¯0B¯
−1
1 ,
which is the product of the n characteristic polynomials fi(X) of the matrices B˜i = (B0 mod pi) ·
(B1 mod pi)
−1. By the Cayley-Hamilton theorem, we must have fi(B˜i) = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This
implies fi(B0 · B1−1 mod x0) = 0 (mod pi). Therefore, if the polynomials fi(X) are irreducible,
they can be recovered by computing f(X) and factoring f(X) into irreducible polynomials. Then
each prime pi can be recovered by computing the gcd of the entries of Mi = fi(B0 ·B1−1 mod x0)
with x0. We provide the source code of the attack in [CP19].
Alternatively, if the polynomials fi(X) are not irreducible, one can still factor f(X) into monic
irreducible factors f ′1, . . . , f ′N ∈ Q[X]. Then for k ∈ [N ], the attacker defines Fk := f/f ′k ∈ Q[X]
and Gk = Fk · dk ∈ Z[X], where dk is the common denominator of Fk’s coefficients. As previously,
by the Cayley-Hamilton theorem we have that Gk(B0 ·B−11 mod x0) = 0 modulo all primes except
one, and therefore the remaining prime pi can be recovered by computing the gcd of the entries of
Mk = Gk(B0 ·B−11 ) mod x0 with x0.
Variant without B0B
−1
1 mod x0. We describe an alternative attack in which one does not need
to compute the matrix B0B
−1
1 mod x0; only the matrix W is used. This alternative attack will
be useful in the context of the tensoring attack from [CLLT17]; in that case we will not have to
compute tensors explicitly as in [CLLT17], which makes the attack slightly simpler.
Our variant attack is as follows. We define the polynomials Gk(X) as previously, and instead of
computing the matrices Mk = Gk(B0 ·B−11 ) mod x0, we compute the matrices:
M ′k = Gk(W ) ·W 0 mod x0
Then as previously each prime pi can be recovered by computing the gcd of the entries of M
′
k with
x0. Namely we have:
M ′k = Gk
(
AB¯0B¯
−1
1 A
−1) ·W 0 (mod x0)
= AGk(B¯0 · B¯−11 )A−1AB¯0C (mod x0)
= AGk(B¯0 · B¯−11 )B¯0C (mod x0)
The characteristic polynomial of W is the same as the one of B¯0 · B¯−11 . Therefore, by the Cayley-
Hamilton theorem, all the blocks on the diagonal of Gk(B¯0 · B¯−11 ) are zero except the block corre-
sponding to B˜i = (B0 mod pi) · (B1 mod pi)−1 for some i. When multiplying by B¯0, such block is
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multiplied by ξi · (B0 mod pi) ∈ Zd×d. Therefore, the resulting block is a multiple of ξi, while all
the other blocks are zero. This implies that all entries of M ′k are multiple of ξi, which is a multiple
of all primes except pi; this enables to recover pi by gcd. We also provide an implementation of this
variant in [CP19].
6.3 Application to our construction
Our attack proceeds as follows. For simplicity we consider the case of 3 users only; the generalization
to N users is straightforward. As in (24) we use sk ∈ {0, 1}` to compute the product matrices in
each row, with:
sk = (sk(1), sk(2), sk(3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
First repetition
, . . . , sk(1), sk(2), sk(3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k-th repetition
)
Since the session key must be the same in the first two rows, we obtain by difference a zero-tested
top-level encoding of zero:
ω = s¯(1)
∏`
i=1
C
(1)
i,sk[i]t¯
(1) − s¯(2)
∏`
i=1
C
(2)
i,sk[i]t¯
(2) (mod x0). (25)
In principle, to produce the attack sets A, B, and C needed for the extended Cheon et al. attack,
one should find a partition of sk so that its first bits affect only the first matrices, the middle bits
affect the matrices in the middle, and the last bits affect only the last matrices. However, the k
repetitions in sk prevents us from constructing such independent sets, because flipping any bit of
sk forces to flip the other k− 1 corresponding bits (otherwise, subtracting two rows does not result
in an encoding of zero). Therefore to generate the attack sets, we use the tensoring technique from
[CLLT17] to group the matrices that depend on the same input bits.
More precisely, given three secrets sk(1), sk(2), sk(3) and a given row u, we let the matrices
Ai :=
∏µ
j=1C
(u)
φ(i,1,j),sk
(1)
j
, Bi :=
∏µ
j=1C
(u)
φ(i,2,j),sk
(2)
j
, Ci :=
∏µ
j=1C
(u)
φ(i,3,j),sk
(3)
j
, where the function
φ(r, v, j) = (r − 1)Nµ+ (v − 1)µ+ j − 1
is used to access the matrices, where 1 ≤ r ≤ k is the repetition index, 1 ≤ v ≤ N is the user index,
and 1 ≤ j ≤ µ is the bit index in sk(v). Therefore Ai is the i-th matrix of the first user computed
using secret sk(1) on row u, Bi is the i-th matrix of the second user, and likewise for Ci. Thus,
given the number of repetitions k, the product of all matrices with respect to sk(1), sk(2), and sk(3)
on row u can be written as
∏k
i=1AiBiCi, where Ck is considered to be an m-dimensional column
vector (that is obtained by multiplying by the right bookend vector) and all the other factors are
m×m matrices.
Using the same tensoring technique as in [CLLT17], we show that this product can be written
as ABC where A is an m×m2k−1 matrix depending only on sk(1), B is an m2k−1×m2k−1 matrix
depending only of sk(2), and C is an m2k−1 × 1 matrix (column vector) depending only of sk(3); see
Appendix B for the details. Since we must compute the difference of two rows as in (25), we must
consider matrices of dimension d = 2m2k−1 instead of m2k−1. Therefore, the final matrices W 0 and
W 1 from the Cheon et al. attack have dimension d
′ = nd = 2nm2k−1. Note that the case for N > 3
users is analogous, since we can simply merge multiple users into the same secret-key, and proceed
as if there were only three users. This implies that the Cheon et al. attack against our construction
has complexity Ω(m2k−1); it is therefore prevented by taking a large enough k. We provide a basic
implementation of the attack in [CP19], including the variant without B0B
−1
1 mod x0 described in
the previous section; in the latter case, the attack recovers the primes pi’s from the matrices W0
and W1 only, without computing tensors explicitly.
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6.4 Practical complexity
We have implemented the previous attack and verified for small n, m, k that it requires a minimal
dimension d′ = 2nm2k−1 to recover the prime factors pi. To estimate the practical complexity of
the attack, we consider only the cost of constructing the matrices W0 and W1. While the attack
also requires to invert W1, find the characteristic polynomial, and factor it over Z, these operations
could probably be performed more efficiently by working modulo a small prime q. 1
The matrices W 0 and W 1 have d
′2 = 4n2m4k−2 elements, and the production of each element
requires at least one vector-matrix multiplication modulo x0 in dimension m, which takes at least
m2 multiplications modulo x0. In our experiments with the Sage library, the number of clock cycles
to compute a modular multiplication of γ bit integers is well approximated by
Tmul(γ) = 0.5 · γ · log2 γ,
where γ = n · η in our scheme. Therefore the complexity of the Cheon et al. attack against our
scheme is lower-bounded by
TCheon(η, n,m, k) = 4η · n3 ·m4k log2(η · n)
and we require TCheon(η, n,m, k) ≥ 2λ.
7 Optimizations and Implementation
In this section we describe a few optimizations in order to obtain a concrete implementation of our
construction from Section 5.
7.1 Encoding of elements
For the bookend vectors, the components are CLT13-encoded with random noise of size ρb bits.
Letting α be the size of the gi’s, for simplicity we take ρb = α. Therefore the encoded bookend
vectors have α · (2m/3)+ρb ·m = 5αm/3 bits of entropy on each slot. For the matrices, we can use a
much smaller encoding noise thanks to the analysis from Section 4.4. On a single slot, the matrices
A
(u)
i,b have entropy ' α · m2/3, and when CLT13-encoded with noise ρm, the matrices A˜(u)i,b have
entropy ' α ·m2/3+ρm ·m2 on each slot; the GCD attack complexity is therefore O˜(2m2·(ρm+α/3)/2).
For the parameters from Table 7 below, it suffices to take ρm = 2 to prevent GCD attacks.
2
7.2 Number of matrices per level
Instead of taking only two matrices A
(u)
i,0 , A
(u)
i,1 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ `, we can take 2τ matrices for each
i. In that case, the secret key of each user has µ words of τ bits, where each word selects one of the
2τ matrices; the size of the secret-key is therefore µ · τ bits. For the same secret-key size, one can
therefore divide the total degree ` by a factor τ , but the number of encoded matrices is multiplied
by a factor 2τ/τ . In order to minimize the size of the public parameters, we use τ = 3. Note that
the straddling set system from [BGK+14] is easily adapted for τ > 1.
1 At least this is true in the original Cheon et al. attack, where the eigenvalues can be computed modulo a small
prime q; see Section 6.1. Using the same approach in the extended attack with the Cayley-Hamilton theorem seems
less straightforward.
2 In a previous version of this paper, we used an aggressive optimization in which the matrices were CLT13 encoded
without noise. However this leads to an attack; we refer to Appendix C for a description of the optimization and
the attack.
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7.3 Other attacks
Orthogonal lattice attack on zero-tested values. There is an orthogonal lattice attack against
the values obtained by subtracting two zero-tested last-level encodings from two different rows. The
attack is analogous to the attack described in Section 3.3, and is prevented under the condition
n = ω( ν
2
η−ν log λ), where ν is the number of extracted bits in the zero-tested values.
Meet-in-the-middle attack. Given the matrix products D
(u→v)
r published by each party u cor-
responding to his secret sk(u), there is a meet-in-the-middle attack that can recover sk(u). Since each
sk(u) has length µ ·τ bits, the attack’s complexity is O(2µ·τ/2). More precisely, the attack complexity
is at least
M(m, γ) · 2µ·τ/2,
where M(m, γ) is the time it takes to multiply m ×m matrices with entries of size γ. We ensure
M(m, γ) · 2µ·τ/2 ≥ 2λ.
7.4 Concrete parameters and implementation results
In this section we propose concrete parameters for our key-exchange construction with N = 4
parties. These parameters are generated so that all known attacks have running time ≥ 2λ clock
cycles. In the construction the total number of encoded matrices is 2τ · ` ·N with τ = 3, with a total
degree ` = µ · k · N . Therefore, the total number of CLT13 encodings is NCLT13 ' 2τ · ` · N ·m2.
The size of the secret key is τµ = 3µ bits. The size η of the primes pi is adjusted so that we extract
ν = λ bits. During the publish phase, each party must broadcast k · (N − 1) matrices of dimension
m×m and γ-bit entries. The size of those broadcasted values along with the other parameters are
shown in Table 7.
λ η m n µ α k γ = n · η ` NCLT13 params broadcast
Small 52 1759 6 160 15 11 2 281 · 103 120 1.4 · 105 4.8 GB 7.6 MB
Medium 62 2602 6 294 21 12 2 764 · 103 168 1.9 · 105 18.5 GB 20 MB
Large 72 3761 6 1349 27 14 2 5073 · 103 216 2.5 · 105 157.8 GB 137 MB
High 82 5159 9 4188 33 16 2 21605 · 103 264 6.8 · 105 1848.0 GB 1312 MB
Table 7. Concrete parameters for a 4-party key-exchange.
The main difference with the original (insecure) key-exchange protocol from [CLT13] is that
we get a much larger public parameter size; for λ = 62 bits of security, we need 18 GB of public
parameters, instead of 70 MB originally. However our construction would be completely unpractical
without Kilian’s randomization on the encoding side. Namely for λ = 62 and a degree ` = 168, one
would need primes pi of size η ' (α+ ρ) · ` ' 2.4 · 104 with α = 80 and ρ = 62 as in [CLT13]. Since
γ = ω(η2 log λ) in [CLT13], one would need γ ' 4 ·109. With NCLT13 = 1.9 ·105, that would require
100 TB of public parameter size. Hence Kilian’s randomization on the encoding side provides a
reduction of the public parameter size by a factor ' 104.
We have implemented the key-exchange protocol in SAGE [S+17] and executed it on a machine
with processor Intel Core i5-8600K CPU (3.60GHz), 32 GB of RAM, and Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS. The
execution times are shown in Table 8. We could not run the Large and High instantiations (λ = 72
and λ = 82) because of the huge parameter size. While the Setup time is significant, since we need
to sample all the random values and perform expensive operations like CRT and inverting matrices,
the Publish and KeyGen times remain reasonable. In fact, each user just has to multiply m × m
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matrices µ · k · (N − 1) times to publish their values and k · (µ+N) times to derive the shared key.
We provide the source code of the key-exchange in [CP19].
Setup (once) Publish (per party) KeyGen (per party)
Small 2 h 20 min 45 s 19 s
Medium 12 h 23 min 3 min 35 s 1 min 24 s
Table 8. Timings for a 4-party key-exchange.
8 Conclusion
We have shown that Kilian’s randomization “on the encoding side” can bring orders of magni-
tude efficiency improvements for iO based constructions when instantiated with CLT13 multilinear
maps. As an application, we have described the first concrete implementation of multipartite DH
key exchange secure against existing attacks. The main advantage of Kilian’s randomization is that
it can be applied essentially for free in any existing implementation; for example it could be easily
integrated in the 5Gen framework [LMA+16] for experimenting with program obfuscation construc-
tions.
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A Kronecker product of matrices
For any two matricesA ∈ Rm×n and B ∈ Rp×q, we define the Kronecker product (or tensor product)
of A and B as the block matrix A⊗B ∈ R(mp)×(nq) given by:
A⊗B =
a11B · · · a1nB... . . . ...
am1B · · · amnB
 , where A = (aij).
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We recall the following property of the Kronecker product [Lau04, Ch. 13]. Given a matrix
C ∈ Rn×m, we let ci ∈ Rn, i = 1, . . . ,m be its column vectors, so that C =
[
c1, . . . , cm
]
. We denote
by vec(C) the column vector of dimension mn formed by stacking the columns ci of C on top of
one another:
vec(C) =
c1...
cm
 ∈ Rmn.
Using the fact that vec(xyT ) = y ⊗ x for any x, y, we obtain that for any three matrices A, B,
and C for which the matrix product A ·B ·C is defined:
vec(A ·B ·C) = (CT ⊗A) · vec(B)
B The tensoring attack
We show that the product
∏k
i=1AiBiCi from Section 6.3 can be written as ABC, using the
tensoring technique from [CLLT17]. The base case with k = 1 is clearly true. For k ≥ 2, we use
induction to write
k∏
i=1
AiBiCi = A1B1C1
(
k∏
i=2
AiBiCi
)
= A1B1C1A˜B˜C˜
with A˜, B˜, and C˜ having dimensions m ×m2(k−1)−1, m2(k−1)−1 ×m2(k−1)−1, and m2(k−1)−1 × 1,
respectively. Then, since C˜ is a column vector, we have
A1B1C1A˜B˜C˜ = A1B1 vec(C1A˜B˜C˜) = A1B1(C˜
T ⊗C1) vec(A˜B˜)
= A1B1(C˜
T ⊗C1) vec(ImA˜B˜)
= A1B1(C˜
T ⊗C1)(B˜T ⊗ Im) vec(A˜)
= vec
(
A1B1(C˜
T ⊗C1)(B˜T ⊗ Im) vec(A˜)
)
= (vec(A˜)T ⊗A1) vec
(
B1(C˜
T ⊗C1)(B˜T ⊗ Im)
)
= (vec(A˜)T ⊗A1)((B˜T ⊗ Im)T ⊗B1) vec(C˜T ⊗C1)
= (vec(A˜)T ⊗A1)((B˜ ⊗ Im)⊗B1) vec(C˜T ⊗C1)
Defining A = vec(A˜)T ⊗A1, B = (B˜ ⊗ Im)⊗B1, and C = vec(C˜T ⊗C1), we obtain
k∏
i=1
AiBiCi = ABC.
Because vec(A˜)T has dimension 1 ×m2(k−1), the dimension of A is m ×m2(k−1)+1 = m ×m2k−1.
Furthermore, the dimension of B˜ ⊗ Im is m2(k−1) × m2(k−1), therefore, the dimension of B is
m2k−1 ×m2k−1. Similarly, the dimension of C is m2k−1 × 1, so the result holds.
C Encoding the matrices without noise
In a previous version of this paper, we used an aggressive optimization in which the matrices A
(u)
i,b
were CLT13-encoded without noise, in order to reduce the bitsize η of the primes pi. Below we
provide a short description of that optimization and an attack that completely breaks it.
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Encoding without noise. One could try to encode the matrices A
(u)
i,b from (21) without any
additional randomness, while relying on the intrinsic randomness of the matrices A
(u)
i,b and on
Kilian’s randomization on the encoding side. Recall that the plaintext space of CLT13 is Zg where
g =
∏n
i=1 gi. Each matrix entry a ∈ Zg is then encoded as an integer c ∈ Zx0 with c ≡ ai (mod pi)
where ai = a mod gi, instead of c ≡ ai + rigi (mod pi); that is, we take ri = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Attack. The above optimization is broken by the following attack. Namely without noise an
encoding of zero is simply 0 modulo x0. Since the matrices A
(u)
i,b are block-diagonal with three
(m/3) × (m/3) blocks on the diagonal, the encoded matrices A˜(u)i,b are then also block-diagonal.
These matrices are hidden by the Kilian matrices, as follows:
C
(u)
i,b := K
(u)
i−1A˜
(u)
i,b
(
K
(u)
i
)−1
(mod x0)
By multiplying consecutive matrices for a given user u and various bits b, one can obtain a large
set of ` known matrices Ci of the form:
Ci = K0 ·Ai ·K1−1 (mod x0)
where the unknown matrices Ai are as previously block-diagonal, and K0 and K1 are unknown
m×m matrices. We can rewrite the previous equation as:
Ai = K0
−1 ·Ci ·K1 (mod x0)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ `. Since the matrices Ai have six (m/3) × (m/3) blocks outside the diagonal equal to
0, we can obtain a system of ` · 6 ·m2/9 quadratic equations in the coefficients of K0−1 and K1.
By linearizing the system, we obtain a system of ` · 6 ·m2/9 equations in (m2)2 = m4 unknowns.
The system can then be solved by linear algebra if ` · 6 · m2/9 > m4, which gives the condition
` > 3m2/2. Once the Kilian matrices K0 and K1 have been recovered (up to a scalar value), the
remaining secret CLT13 parameters can be recovered by solving the Approximate-GCD problem
with much smaller parameters than in the original CLT13.
30
